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Abstract 
The study analyses wage adjustment by Italian firms on the basis of information 
collected through a coordinated survey carried out in 17 European countries in two waves (at 
the beginning of 2008 and in the summer of 2009). The pre-crisis evidence indicates that the 
degree of wage rigidity is relatively high in Italy: wages remain unchanged on average for 
about two years, against an average of just over one year in the other countries. Italian firms 
hardly cut nominal wages, reflecting not only institutional constraints, but also an attempt to 
avoid a negative impact on their productivity. During the economic recession the firms most 
severely affected by the fall in demand reduced their costs mainly by adjusting the input of 
labour (in terms of both employment and hours worked). A higher incidence of skilled and 
white-collar workers was accompanied by greater recourse to strategies aimed at containing 
non-labour costs, presumably in order to preserve the human capital accumulated. 
 
Keywords: survey, wage rigidity, economic recession. 





2. The survey ...........................................................................................................................6 
3. The Italian wage-bargaining institutional framework .........................................................8 
4. Firm-level wage adjustment in “normal” times.................................................................10 
4.1  Frequency and timing of wage adjustment.................................................................10 
4.2 Downward  wage  rigidity............................................................................................12 
5. Any difference during the 2008-09 recession?..................................................................15 
5.1  The effect of the crisis on firms’ activity.....................................................................15 
5.2  Firms’ wage policies ..................................................................................................16 
5.3  Alternative strategies for cost reduction ....................................................................18 
6. Conclusions........................................................................................................................22 
References..............................................................................................................................23 
Appendix A – The 2009 survey questionnaire.......................................................................26 






* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.  
  This paper has been prepared in the context of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamic Network (WDN) research 
project. The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Institution they belong to.  
  5 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores Italian firms’ wage-setting practices and cost adjustment strategies, exploiting 
the evidence provided by firm-level surveys carried out in the context of a Eurosystem research project, the 
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). 
The analysis focuses on two main issues. The first concerns how firms “normally” set and adjust 
wages in Italy. These aspects are addressed by analysing both the institutional framework that governs 
wage setting and various features of firm-level wages that shape their aggregate degree of rigidity. The 
second  issue  is  to  what  extent  the  severe  economic  downturn  that  occurred  in  2008-09  produced 
“exceptional” reactions by firms and softened the constraints that typically hinder wage adjustment.  
Both  questions  are  important  because  of  the  role  played  by  wage  and  price  adjustment  in  the 
transmission of monetary policy to the real economy, in particular within a multi-country monetary union 
with still segmented labour markets such as the euro area. The degree of wage flexibility is one of the 
determinants of the speed at which national economies adjust to shocks and of the related costs. More 
generally, the current debate on the macroeconomic imbalances among euro-area countries highlights 
wage  and  price  adjustment  as  a  correction  mechanism.  In  this  light,  any  evidence  that  improves  our 
knowledge and assessment of the behaviour of wages increases our ability to anticipate the reaction of 
macro variables (Christiano et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2005; Blanchard and Galì, 2007). 
The WDN survey was deployed in a large number of European economies, in two waves: the first 
between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008; the second in mid-2009. Its design partly drew upon 
previous corporate surveys carried out in other countries, mostly the United States and a few European 
economies (Blinder and Choi, 1990; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Franz and 
Pfeiffer,  2006),  focusing  on  the  extent  and  causes  of  downward  wage  rigidity.  The  most  important 
contribution of the WDN survey to this literature is twofold. First, it collects a rich set of cross-country 
information regarding not only firm-level characteristics, but also aspects such as firms’ wage and price-
setting strategies, the extent and sources of wage and price rigidities and how they feed into each other, 
the  reaction  of  firms  to  economic  shocks,  the  various  channels  for  reducing  labour  costs,  and  the 
institutional features governing wage behaviour. Second, it extends the analysis to the cost-adjustment 
mechanisms actually adopted by firms during the 2008-09 global recession, assessing the robustness of 
their strategies (and of the constraints they faced) in the presence of a demand shock exceptionally severe 
in a historical perspective. 
The use of such an extensive database, though of a qualitative nature, has important advantages. It 
makes it possible to exploit information at the firm level that is usually not observable in other types of 
data  used  in  the  literature.  Moreover,  its  cross-country  and  cross-sector  dimensions  enable  to  assess 
whether and how firm-level wage policies are affected by product and labour market characteristics, and in 
particular by the institutional environment that governs wage determination. Finally, whereas in firm-level 
quantitative datasets, such as matched employer-employee ones, the shocks hitting firms are typically not 
observed and need to be inferred, the 2009 WDN survey provides direct information on the nature and 
amplitude of the shocks which hit European firms during the last economic recession.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the survey. Section 
3 focuses on the institutional framework regulating wage bargaining in Italy. Section 4 presents the aspects  
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of firm-level wage behaviour that have a bearing on the stickiness of wages. The shocks faced by Italian 
firms  during  the  2008-09  crisis  and  the  wage  and  labour  input  adjustment  strategies  they  adopted  in 
response  to  them  are  addressed  in  Section  5,  which  also  presents  an  econometric  exercise  aimed  at 
capturing, within a multivariate framework, the main features that discriminate firms in the way they chose 
to reduce costs. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The survey 
The data used in this paper is a subset of a cross-country dataset collected, through two coordinated 
firm-level surveys on price and wage setting, in the context of the WDN. The first survey was carried out 
between the end of 2007 and the first half of 2008 by the national central banks of nineteen European 
countries (in Italy in the second quarter of 2009).
1 The samples were designed so as to be representative at 
the country level and the questionnaires were harmonised across countries.
2 In the summer of 2009 a 
follow-up survey was conducted in a sub-group of countries (ten, including Italy), with the specific aim of 
investigating the impact of the global crisis on wage and labour adjustment policies in the firms that had 
participated in the original survey. Country-level micro data were pooled to create a single dataset covering 
about 18,000 firms operating in different economic sectors.  
In Italy, the two surveys were submitted to a sample drawn from that used by the Bank of Italy for its 
annual  business  survey.
3  The  reference  population  consists  of  firms  with  more  than  5  employees  in 
manufacturing and services (trade, market services and financial intermediation), stratified according to 
size  and  geographical  area.  Of  the  4,000  sampled  firms,  about  1,000  completed  the  questionnaire 
submitted to them in December 2007 (Table 1). The response rate (about 25%) is satisfactory for this kind 
of  survey  and  in  line  with  that  of  other  countries  (Druant  et  al.,  2009).  The  same  respondents  were 
contacted again in August 2009 and sent a much shorter questionnaire, focused on the crisis.
4 Overall, 
more than two-thirds replied; the sector and size breakdowns are similar in the two surveys. 
Table 1 – The survey samples 
(percentages except as indicated) 
   Sector     Size     Total 
  Manufacturing  Services    5-19  20-49  50-199  200+      # firms 
2007 survey  45.5  54.5    3.2  37.0  17.8  42.1    100  953 
2009 survey  46.4  53.6     2.9  37.9  17.7  41.5     100  677 
 
The harmonised questionnaire of the 2007 survey was organised in four sections, all focused on 
“typical conditions and practices”. The first regarded wage-setting practices and institutional arrangements, 
and the frequency and timing of wage changes. The second section addressed the (potential) obstacles to 
downward wage adjustment and the reaction of firms to different types of hypothetical shock; the third 
                                                 
1   All the countries belonging to the euro area are included except Finland and Malta. 
2  Only information collected in Germany is not comparable to that of the other countries due to major differences in 
the questionnaire; this is why German data are not considered in this paper. 
3  The questionnaire was submitted mainly over the Internet. The person required to fill in the questionnaire was the 
CEO or the HR Manager. 
4   For the questionnaire of the 2007 survey, see Druant et al. (2009); the Italian questionnaire of the 2009 survey is 
reported in Appendix A of this paper.  
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focused on price-setting and the frequency of price changes.
5 The final section gathered information about 
the firm, such as the structure of the workforce, the share of labour in total costs, the exposure to foreign 
markets, the intensity of competitive pressures.  
Table 2 summarises some of the above features for the Italian sample. The share of labour costs in 
total  costs  is  on  average  around  30%;  unsurprisingly,  it  is  significantly  higher  in  service  firms  than  in 
manufacturing  firms  (37%  and  25%,  respectively).  The  vast  majority  of  the  workforce  (above  80%)  is 
employed on a full-time basis; more than 90% with permanent contracts, with only marginal differences 
across  sectors.  On  the  contrary,  significant  cross-sectoral  differences  emerge  with  respect  to  the  skill 
distribution  of  employees:  about  65%  of  manufacturing  firms’  workforce  consists  of  production  and 
technical workers, whereas in services almost 60% of employees are clerical or professional. Turning to 
firms’ degree of openness, about one-third of manufacturing firms’ turnover comes from sales on foreign 
markets; the proportion is much lower for service firms (less than 10%). 
Table 2 – Company characteristics  




Main occupational group     Type of workers    
Export 
 share 
    Production  Technical  Clerical  Professional    Full-time  Part-time  Temporary      
Total  31  31  21  21  27    84  8  8    21 
Manufacturing  25  38  26  15  22    88  4  7    35 
Services  37  25  17  27  32     80  11  9     9 
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-responses. The services sector includes trade, 
market services and financial intermediation. 
 
Firms were required to refer their answers on wage policies to their “main occupational group” and 
to  “normal  conditions  and  behaviour”;  in  the  case  of  quantitative  information  (for  instance  on  the 
composition of the workforce) the reference period was the previous accounting year (2006).  
When the first survey was carried out, the global economy was just starting to be affected by the 
financial crisis originating in the US sub-prime mortgage market and by the sharp increase in international 
commodity prices. In the fourth quarter of 2007 Italian GDP increased by 0.1% y-o-y (Table 3); households’ 
consumption  and  fixed  investment  decelerated  in  line  with  GDP  and  foreign  demand  was  increasingly 
restrained by the appreciation of the exchange rate and the economic slowdown in major outlet markets. 
In  this  scenario,  Italian  labour  market  conditions  were  still  favourable:  more  people  were  employed 
compared with the previous year and the rate of unemployment was low (6.4%), though rising compared 
with the previous two quarters.  
Table 3 –  The Italian economic outlook at the time of the surveys 
(y-o-y percentage changes, except as indicated) 
  GDP Consensus Economics 
 
GDP  HICP 
Unemployment rate 
(%)  Current year  Next year 
2007 survey (2007-Q4)  0.1  2.6  6.4  1.8  1.3 
2009 survey (2009-Q2)  -6.1  0.9  7.5  -5.1  0.1 
 
                                                 
5   This  part  of  the  questionnaire  largely  mirrors  the  structure  of  the  survey  carried  out  in  the  context  of  the 
Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (Fabiani et al., 2007).  
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In  July  2009,  when  firms  were  contacted  again,  the  economic  environment  had  changed 
considerably. In the second quarter of the year the fall in economic activity was very pronounced (-6.1% y-
o-y; -0.5% q-o-q); inflation was very low (0.9% y-o-y compared with the peak of 4.1% in the summer of 
2008). The unemployment rate rose to 7.5% and the short-term outlook was highly uncertain; growth 
expectations pointed to stagnation in 2010, with substantial downside risks. 
The analysis presented in the remainder of the paper is based on data from the 2007 survey, with the 
exception of section 6, which is based on the 2009 survey data. Results are computed using “employment-
adjusted” weights.
6  
3. The Italian wage-bargaining institutional framework 
A large body of theoretical studies (see Freeman, 2007 for a summary) deals with the relationship 
between labour market institutional settings and economic outcomes. Specifically, bargaining institutions 
are seen as playing an important role for the dynamics of wages, affecting in particular the extent and 
speed with which they adjust to economic shocks.  
On  the  empirical  side,  however,  despite  the  extensive  literature  devoted  to  qualifying  and 
quantifying this role, the actual link between institutions and outcomes is difficult to measure, mostly due 
to the limited amount of comparable information at the international level. The WDN survey partly fills this 
gap, by collecting harmonised firm-level information on a number of institutional features affecting wage 
setting (the degree of centralisation of collective wage bargaining, its coverage, the extent and nature of 
indexation mechanisms) in European countries. 
In this international comparison, Italy stands out  as one of the countries (together with France, 
Belgium and Austria) where virtually all firms apply a national collective agreement; about 40% of Italian 
firms also report the existence of firm-level collective bargaining (Table 4). 
Overall,  the  euro  area  appears  as  characterised  by  highly  centralised  bargaining  systems,  with 
national or sectoral contracts applied on average by 86% of firms and firm-level agreements, replacing or 
complementing  the  higher-level  provisions,  only  by  36%.  Conversely,  wage  negotiations  are  more 
decentralised and predominantly organised at the company level in non-euro area countries, where only 
6% of companies apply national or sectoral contracts as against 23% that resort to firm-level collective 
bargaining (in such countries, only about one-fifth of employees are covered by collective agreements). 
The picture emerging from the WDN firm-level data confirms the centralised nature of the Italian 
institutional framework for wage negotiations, which in the last two decades saw two major innovations. 
In  1992-93  the  Income  Policy  Agreement  replaced  the  so-called  “scala  mobile”  (the  automatic 
indexation of wages to past inflation), introducing a two-tier structure of bargaining: national contracts 
devoted to maintaining wages’ purchasing power and firm-level contracts devoted to the distribution of 
productivity gains. The length of national contracts was set at two years for wage determination and at four 
years  for  the  regulatory  aspects;  wage  rises  were  linked  to  the  Government’s  inflation  target  for  the 
following biennium. At the end of the two-year horizon, the social partners could agree on further wage 
compensation in the event of a difference between actual and target inflation; however, the amount of 
                                                 
6   The weights are the ratio between the number of employees in the population in a sampling category (sector, firm 
size) and that of firms in the same category. They add up to total employment in the population the sample 
represents.   
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such compensation was not automatic but had to be agreed within a more general bargaining framework, 
with  account  taken,  inter  alia,  of  macroeconomic  conditions.  Company-level  contracts  envisaged 
performance-related wage premia, with the aim of creating a productivity-stimulating environment. The 
new framework also introduced new rules on temporary contracts and flexible working time arrangements. 





Employees covered by 
collective contracts 
  National level  Firm level    
AT  96  23  95 
BE  98  35  88 
CY  25  28  33 
CZ  17  51  50 
EE  3  10  9 
ES  84  16  97 
FR  99  58  67 
GR  86  21  91 
HU  -  -  - 
IE  68  31  39 
IT  100  43  97 
LT  1  24  16 
LU  43  17  44 
NL  46  30  68 
PL  5  20  18 
PT  59  9  55 
SI  75  25  . 
SVK  18  56  56 
Total  65  32  67 
Euro area  86  36  83 
Non-euro area  6  23  21 
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-
responses.  
 
Overall,  the  1992-93  reform  was  successful  in  producing  wage  moderation,  as  it  contributed 
significantly to bringing Italian inflation into line with that of the other major European countries and to 
anchoring inflation expectations.
7 It also made an important contribution to enhancing the flexibility of the 
labour market. However, the role of firm-level bargaining remained limited compared with the original 
intentions,
8  partly  owing  to  the  relatively  poor  productivity  gains  recorded  in  the  years  after  1993 
(Brandolini et al., 2007; Visco, 2008; Brandolini and Bugamelli, 2009). 
The second major innovation in the Italian bargaining system was the agreement signed in the spring 
of 2009. The new setup confirms the previous two-tier structure and extends the duration of both the 
economic and the work-rules parts of contracts to three years. Importantly, wage increases under the 
national contract are no longer linked to the Government’s inflation target but to a new three-year inflation 
                                                 
7   See Fabiani et al. (1997) for an estimate of the impact of the new income policy in Italy on headline inflation. 
Casadio (2003) contains a detailed description of the 1992-93 agreement and reports some empirical evidence on 
the effects of its introduction.
 
8   According to the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Industrial and Service Firms with at least 20 workers, the incidence of 
company-level  bargaining  has  decreased  over  time,  reaching  26%  in  2008.  Since  2000  the  share  of  workers 
covered by second-level agreements fell from 77% to 68% in firms with 50 or more workers and from 36% to 22% 
in those with 20-49 workers (Bank of Italy Annual Report on 2008).  
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forecast based on the harmonised index of consumer prices net of imported energy products.
9 As before, 
the difference between actual and forecast inflation is not automatically recovered ex-post but is subject to 
negotiation. Firm-level bargaining is encouraged through tax relief on wage increases linked to productivity, 
with  the  aim  of  increasing  the  proportion  of  workers  covered  by  second-level  contracts,  which  is  still 
modest, especially in small and medium sized firms. An empirical evaluation of the impact of the new 
system is still premature, not least owing to the severe global recession under way at the time it was 
introduced.  
4. Firm-level wage adjustment in “normal” times 
How does the Italian bargaining system, with its high degree of centralisation, scant development of 
firm-level agreements and relatively limited role of inflation in wage setting, affect wage dynamics and in 
particular its degree of flexibility?  
Empirical studies based on cross-country data assembled within the WDN project show that wages 
are less flexible in the presence of  centralised bargaining and  employment protection legislation (EPL; 
Druant et al., 2009) and that the degree of downward real wage rigidity is positively associated with the 
coverage of collective agreements (Du Caju et al., 2009; Babecky et al., 2009a; Messina et al., 2010). The 
latter, together with employment protection, also influences the way firms react to shocks, making wage 
reductions a less likely means of cost adjustment (Bertola et al., 2009). 
This section analyses firm-level wage behaviour in Italy, focusing on some of the features – such as 
the frequency and timing of wage changes and the extent and causes of downward wage rigidity – that 
determine the aggregate degree of wage flexibility. It does not address the issue of EPL, as it was not 
covered in the WDN harmonised survey. 
4.1 Frequency and timing of wage adjustment  
A first indication of the stickiness of wage adjustment can be gathered by analysing how frequently 
firms typically modify wages. The WDN survey enquired about three types of firm-level wage adjustment 
related, respectively, to tenure, inflation and other factors. The exact wording of the question in each case 
was: “How frequently is the base wage of an employee belonging to the main occupational group in your 
firm typically changed?”. Respondents could choose one of the following options: “more than once a year”; 
“once a year”; “once every two years”; “less frequently than once every two years”; “never / don’t know”. 
In order to simplify the description of the results, we computed a synthetic measure, which assigns to each 
firm  a  frequency  corresponding  to  the  highest  among  those  reported  for  the  three  types  of  wage 
adjustment described above (we label it as “wage change frequency for any reason”). 
The results for Italy indicate that on average only about 30% of firms adjust the wages of their 
employees at least once a year (Figure 1); almost two-thirds do it less frequently, the vast majority of them 
once every two years. This is not surprising, as the national contract length at the time of the survey was 
two  years  for  all  sectors.
10  As  for  the  reasons  driving  wage  changes,  tenure  stands  out  as  the  factor 
                                                 
9   So far the forecast has been updated in May by ISAE; this Institute ceased to exist on December 31, 2010; many of 
its scientific and institutional functions were transferred to ISTAT, in particular those related to the economic 
analysis. 
10   This also explains the lack of significant differences across sectors.  
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producing the most infrequent changes (once every two years for about 85% of firms, in line with other 
countries). Inflation is a driver of wage changes only for about 40% of firms. 













for any reason apart from tenure or inflation due to tenure due to inflation
more frequently than once a year yearly
once every two years less frequently than once every two years
never/dontknow  
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
The extent of wage rigidity can also be measured by the number of months for which wages remain 
unchanged (“duration”). Though this indicator is still based on the answers concerning the frequency of 
wage changes, its computation requires additional assumptions. In particular, whereas some frequency 
categories translate directly into durations (e.g. “once a year” translates into a duration of 12 months), 
others refer to intervals (e.g. “less frequently than once every two years”) and therefore an expected 
duration needs to be imputed.
11 According to this indicator, wages in Italy remain unchanged, on average, 
just over 20 months. This result is consistent with the characteristics of the centrally negotiated contracts, 
which had a two-year duration at the time of the survey, and also reflects the limited role of firm-level 
negotiations. 
In the international comparison, the frequency of wage adjustment in Italy is the lowest among all 
the countries participating in the WDN survey (Druant et al., 2009). On average about 60% of the 17,000 
firms interviewed across Europe change wages at least once a year (a further 10-15% do so even more 
frequently); in terms of duration, wages are kept stable for about 15 months.
12 
Aside from its frequency, the nature of wage adjustment might also have a bearing on the extent of 
aggregate wage rigidity. In particular, in the presence of frequent shocks time-dependent rules, where the 
timing of the adjustment does not depend on the state of the economy but takes place at specific times of 
the  year,  might  lead  to  higher  nominal  rigidity  than  state-dependent  rules  (for  the  impact  on  the 
                                                 
11   For methodological details on the procedure adopted to impute expected durations in such cases, see Druant et al. 
(2009). An important qualification is that durations are not computed for firms that report “never/don’t know” to 
the question on the frequency of wage changes, which are only about 4%. 
12   A relatively low degree of wage flexibility can also have a positive impact on aggregate developments, for example 
preventing  the  rapid  translation  of  unexpected  positive  shocks  to  raw  material  prices  into  upward  wage 
adjustment and hence softening the so called “second round” effects on inflation.  
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transmission of shocks, see for example Olivei and Tenreyro, 2007 and 2008).
13 With a view to obtaining 
evidence on this issue, the WDN survey enquired whether firms’ wage changes were typically concentrated 
in particular month(s) or took place with no pre-defined pattern.  
In Italy, about one third of firms follow a time-dependent wage-setting strategy, with the majority 
making the adjustment in January.
14 This evidence, robust across sectors, points to a significant degree of 
synchronisation and clustering in wage changes, in line with what was found in other euro-area countries. 
Overall, the cross-country variation in both the incidence of time-dependence and the timing of wage 
changes appears to be remarkable (see Druant et al., 2009).
15 
4.2 Downward wage rigidity 
An important aspect that qualifies the degree and nature of wage rigidity is the presence and extent 
of reasons that prevent nominal or real wages from being adjusted downwards. 
Aside  from  its  theoretical  explanations,  the  resistance  of  wages  to  adjust  downwards  has 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy and its transmission to the real economy. The debate on its 
consequences for the choice of the optimal inflation rate goes back to the well-known question of whether 
inflation can “grease” the wheels of the economy by allowing easier wage adjustments (Tobin, 1972). 
Recently the issue became topical again following the moderation of inflation in the advanced economies 
and triggered a growing  body of empirical literature focusing  on whether  there is indeed evidence  of 
downward wage rigidity. Studies based on quantitative data of the distributions of wage changes across 
workers  (Dickens  et  al,  2007)  and  sectors  (Holden  and  Wulfsberg,  2007)  were  supplemented  by  a 
completely different branch of empirical work which relied instead on firm-level surveys, triggered by the 
seminal work of Blinder and Choi (1990).
16  
Following this approach, the WDN survey asked firms across Europe whether they had cut or frozen 
base wages in the preceding five-year period and, if not, what factors had prevented wage cuts. The explicit 
aim was to assess and compare the degree and sources of downward nominal rigidity across European 
countries. The former was measured on the basis of the incidence of wage cuts and freezes reported by 
firms, in line with most of the studies mentioned above.  
In Italy wage reductions were practically nil in the period 2002-07 (implemented by less than 1% of 
firms; Table 5). Wage freezes were slightly more common, but still reported by less than 4% of firms, with a 
somewhat higher incidence in services.  
Comparison of these figures with those obtained for the other European countries indicates that the 
inability of firms to reduce or freeze nominal wages is a common feature in the euro area (respectively 
1.4% and 7.4% of firms), though relatively more pronounced in Italy. In non-euro area countries, instead, 
                                                 
13   Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) show that in Japan, where most firms set their wages between February and May, a 
monetary policy shock occurring in the first half of the year should have a smaller impact on real activity, since this 
is a period of more flexible wages, than a shock occurring in the second half. Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) derive 
similar results for the United States where wage changes are concentrated at the turn of the year. 
14   The peak in the frequency of wage changes at the beginning of each year also emerges from other studies based 
on micro quantitative data (Knell and Stiglbauer, 2008; Heckel et al., 2008; Lünnemann and Wintr, 2009). 
15   Lithuania is the country with the lowest concentration of wage changes in specific months (17%); at the other 
extreme Portugal has the highest proportion (94%). More generally, the percentage of firms that adopt time-
dependent wage rules exceeds 70% in Spain, the Netherlands, France and Greece. 
16   See for instance Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003).  
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wages appear to be slightly less constrained downwards, with 4.9% and 11.3% of firms declaring that they 
had reduced/frozen wages in the five-year period prior to the survey.  
Table 5 – Downward nominal rigidity: wage cuts and freezes 
(percentages of firms that cut or froze wages in the five years before the survey) (1) 
   Italy     Euro area  Non-euro area  Total 
  Manufacturing  Services  Total         
freezes  3.2  4.4  3.9    7.4  11.3  8.5 
cuts  0.2  1.1  0.7     1.4  4.9  2.4 
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-
responses. 
Various theories predicting downward wage rigidity have been proposed in the literature. According 
to  efficiency  wage  models,  wage  cuts  hinder  workers’  productivity  and  effort,  hence  reducing  firms’ 
profitability  (Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984;  Akerlof  and  Yellen,  1990).  Adverse  selection  theories  suggest, 
instead, that the most productive workers are most likely to quit their job as a reaction to a wage cut, 
causing a decline in the firm’s productivity (Weiss, 1980). In turnover models, wage reductions increase 
employee turnover and lead to higher hiring and training costs (Stiglitz, 1974). Another branch of the 
literature focuses on the role of institutional factors in shaping the degree of downward wage rigidity (see 
Holden, 1994), arguing for example that the latter is positively related to the centralisation of wage setting 
and the coverage of union contracts (Oswald, 1986). Finally, an argument originally put forward by Keynes 
(1936) is that workers oppose wage cuts unless the latter are widespread throughout the economy, that is, 
they care about relative wages.  
Empirically  testing  the  validity  and  relative  importance  of  these  theoretical  explanations  is  not 
straightforward,  as  most  of  them  involve  non-observable  variables  such  as  effort  and  informational 
asymmetries.  Interview  surveys  with  company  managers  partly  overcome  this  difficulty  and  provide 
evidence that may help to discriminate among alternative theories. In this vein, the 2007 WDN survey 
directly asked firms to assess the importance of several reasons that prevented them from cutting wages 
when needed, selected among the most popular theories proposed by the literature. Table 6 presents the 
list of such theories together with the mean score attached by Italian firms to each of them.  
Table 6 – Factors preventing wage cuts in Italy  
(mean scores) (1) 
Labour regulation/collective agreements prevent wages from being cut  3.6 
Faced with wage cuts the most productive employees might leave the firm  3.6 
Wage cuts would reduce employees’ efforts and morale, resulting in less output or poorer service   3.4 
Wage cuts would increase the number of employees who quit, increasing the cost of hiring and training  3.4 
Employees compare their wages with those of similarly qualified workers in other firms in the same market  3.3 
Wage cuts would create difficulties in attracting new workers  3.1 
Wage cuts would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer  2.8 
Workers and firms have an implicit contract: wages will neither fall in recessions nor rise in expansions  2.5 
(1) Average mean scores are computed from the answers provided by the firms interviewed in the 2007 survey 
to the question: “If your firm has not (or is not considering to) cut the base wage, how relevant is each one of the 
following reasons in preventing it?”. Firms were required to answer for each of the theories provided in the list, 
attaching a score from 1=not relevant to 4=very relevant. 
 
The  highest  position  in  the  list  is  achieved  (mean  score  of  3.6)  by  two  competing  arguments: 
institutional constraints – imposed by labour market regulations or by collective agreements – and adverse 
selection effects related to the risk that the most productive workers would leave the firm in response to a  
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nominal  wage  cut.  The  second  most  relevant  obstacles  to  wage  reductions  are  (mean  score  3.4)  the 
potential negative impact on workers effort and/or morale, as predicted by efficiency wage theories, and 
the costs of hiring and training new workers that would derive from the exit of incumbents, in line with 
turnover models. Relative wage arguments are ranked third (mean score 3.3). 
The results for Italy are in line with those obtained for the whole sample of European firms (see 
Fabiani et al., 2010a), according to which the two explanations most acknowledged by company managers 
are productivity-related arguments due to both workers effort and morale and adverse selection effects. A 
slightly lower degree of importance is attached to institutional constraints, which turn out to be much less 
binding in non-euro-area countries. This is consistent with earlier research conducted in the United States 
(Bewley, 1999 and Campbell and Kamlani, 1997). 
Though the evidence provided so far points to a fairly high degree of downward rigidity of nominal 
wages in Italy, it does not allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the extent of real-wage rigidity, i.e. the 
(im)possibility for firms to increase wages by less than the inflation rate. This aspect is likely to be linked to 
either the existence of a formal indexation mechanism at the national level and/or to the pervasiveness of 
wage adjustment to inflation at the company level (Babecký et al., 2009a).  
Table 7 – Wage adjustment to inflation  
(percentage of firms reporting the existence of  
an internal policy of base wage adjustment to inflation) (1) 
  Total  Automatic rule  Informal rule 
AT  24  10  12 
BE  98  98  0 
CY  48  41  8 
CZ  60  12  51 
EE  54  5  50 
ES  70  54  16 
FR  33  10  27 
GR  47  20  23 
HU  33  11  20 
IE  33  10  28 
IT  6  2  4 
LT  48  11  37 
LU  100  100  0 
NL  -  -  - 
PL  31  7  23 
PT  52  9  42 
SI  60  23  37 
SVK  60  21  39 
Total  36  17  19 
Euro area  36  9  15 
Non-euro area  38  30  30 
(1)  The  figures  are  weighted  by  employment 
weights and rescaled excluding non-responses. 
 
In Italy, as discussed in Section 2, wage indexation as a national institutional arrangement no longer 
exists. Expected inflation enters centralised wage negotiations but the ex-post recovery of differences with 
respect to actual price developments is not automatic. However, past or expected inflation can be taken 
into account in the adjustment of wages at the firm level, either formally or informally. The WDN survey, 
which explicitly enquired about this aspect of firm-level wage negotiations, indicates that only about 6% of 
Italian  firms  take  inflation  into  account  in  their  wage-setting  strategies,  mostly  through  an  informal  
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mechanism (Table 7).
17 This percentage is the lowest among European countries, reflecting the very modest 
role of second-tier firm-level bargaining in Italy. 
All in all, the WDN survey results highlight a very low incidence of base wage reductions and freezes 
by Italian firms compared with other countries, which suggests a relatively high degree of nominal wage 
rigidity. Conversely, the absence of a formal national indexation mechanism and the limited role of wage 
adjustment  to  inflation  at  the  firm  level  indicate  that  downward  real  wage  rigidity  is  a  less  stringent 
constraint.  
5. Any difference during the 2008-09 recession? 
Have Italian firms’ wage adjustment policies changed as a reaction to the 2008-09 recession, the 
most severe since World War II (Bassanetti et al., 2009)? The exceptional economic downturn is a natural 
framework for assessing the robustness of a specific feature of the behaviour of wages in Italy, that is, their 
downward  rigidity.  Moreover,  it  offers  the  opportunity  to  investigate  the  persistence  or  easing  of  the 
constraints that typically limit the recourse to wage cuts within the range of strategies firms can adopt to 
contain their costs. The survey conducted in summer 2009, about one and a half years after the first, 
provides some evidence on these issues, as it was specifically designed to assess the response of wages and 
labour costs in the new environment. 
5.1 The effect of the crisis on firms’ activity  
The survey first required firms to assess the intensity and nature of the impact of the crisis on their 
activity. It was strong for 37% of Italian firms and exceptionally strong for about 5%; only 10% were not 
affected at all (Table 8). Manufacturing firms, more exposed to the collapse of world trade, were the most 
penalised: almost 55% suffered either an exceptionally strong or a strong negative effect, compared to 32% 
for service firms. The crisis impacted more negatively on the economic activity of smaller firms (with less 
than 50 employees) than on that of larger ones.  
Table 8 – Impact of the crisis on firms’ activity  
(percentages) (1) 
   Sector     Size    
  Manufacturing  Services    5-19  20-49  50-199  200+   
All firms 
Positive  1.3  0.8    0.0  1.7  1.8  0.2    1.1 
None  5.3  13.8    6.6  7.4  10.6  12.1    9.9 
Negative:                   
     marginally  6.4  12.3    6.0  6.0  6.7  14.3    9.6 
     moderately  33.7  41.4    37.3  36.4  38.0  39.1    37.8 
     strongly  43.8  30.8    45.4  44.3  35.0  30.2    36.9 
     exceptionally strongly  9.4  0.9    4.7  4.2  7.9  4.2    4.8 
Total  100  100     100  100  100  100     100 
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-responses. 
                                                 
17   Though price developments do not appear as a major driver of firms’ wage dynamics in Italy, the relationship in 
the opposite direction is somewhat stronger (see Appendix B). Bertola et al. (2008) find that the effect of wage 
changes on price dynamics is larger in firms with a high labour share, confirming previous evidence from the 
Inflation Persistence Network. Druant et al. (2009) find that the frequency of wage changes has a statistically 
significant effect on the frequency of price changes.   
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As for the nature of the shock faced by firms, the main channels through which the crisis manifested 
itself  were  examined  along  three  dimensions  in  the  survey:  fall  in  demand,  financial  constraints,  and 
difficulty in being paid by customers. Firms were asked to rate the importance of these three factors. Table 
9a reveals that, overall, the fall in demand was the aspect that affected firms’ activity most severely (it was 
exceptionally strong or strong for around 44% of firms), followed by difficulty in being paid by customers 
(43%) and financial constraints (21%).
18 
In  all  three  respects  manufacturing  firms  were  significantly  more  penalised  than  service  firms 
(Table 9b), in particular regarding the intensity of the fall in demand (with twice as many firms declaring an 
exceptionally  strong  or  strong  impact:  60%  against  30%).  Similarly,  firms  with  less  than  50  employees 
(Table 9c) were the most affected; in particular, very small companies (5-19 employees) were both the 
most financially constrained (61% against around 20% for the other size classes) and had the greatest 
difficulty in being paid by customers (76% against 50%). 
Table 9 – Channels through which the crisis affected firms’ activity  
(percentages) (1) 
(a) by sector 
  Demand fall    Financial constraints     Difficulty in being paid 
  Total  Manuf.  Services    Total  Manuf.  Services    Total  Manuf.  Services 
None / marginal  14.1  8.3  19.1    45.5  41.5  49.2    15.0  11.2  18.3 
Moderate  41.8  32.0  50.2    29.8  29.5  30.1    40.7  40.5  41.0 
Strong  36.6  47.2  27.4    16.5  19.9  13.4    32.4  37.1  28.3 
Exceptionally strong  7.1  12.5  2.5    4.3  6.9  2.1    10.2  10.2  10.2 
Don't know  0.4  0.0  0.8    3.8  2.2  5.2    1.7  1.1  2.3 
Total  100  100  100    100  100  100    100  100  100 
 
(b) by size 
   Demand fall     Financial constraints     Difficulty in being paid 
  5-19  20-49  50-199  200+    5-19  20-49  50-199  200+    5-19  20-49  50-199  200+ 
None / marginal  6.0  9.0  14.0  19.2    29.1  44.5  48.0  46.7    5.7  8.5  15.4  21.4 
Moderate  43.9  37.9  39.1  46.3    8.3  30.4  31.6  30.1    18.1  40.3  39.3  43.4 
Strong  45.4  45.8  32.7  29.3    48.8  17.8  14.6  13.7    33.3  40.3  31.8  25.3 
Exceptionally strong  4.7  6.2  13.9  5.2    12.2  4.0  3.5  4.5    42.9  10.4  13.2  6.3 
Don't know  0.0  1.0  0.3  0.0    1.6  3.3  2.4  5.0    0.0  0.5  0.3  3.6 
Total  100  100  100  100     100  100  100  100     100  100  100  100 
(1) The figures are weighted by employment weights and rescaled excluding non-responses. 
5.2 Firms’ wage policies 
Facing a sharply deteriorating labour market, high uncertainty about the timing and strength of the 
recovery and nearly zero inflation, a much higher proportion of Italian firms kept wages unchanged during 
the crisis, about one-third as opposed to less than 4% in the “normal times” situation analysed in the 2007 
survey (Table 10a), the remaining two-thirds planned to do so in the near future.
19 Downward nominal 
rigidity remains, however, a robust feature of wage behaviour in Italy: despite the exceptional contraction 
in economic activity and rising unemployment, only 2% of firms implemented wage reductions and 4% 
intended to do so in the future. 
                                                 
18   For further evidence of the effects of the global crisis on Italian firms, based on a different data source, see 
Bugamelli et al. (2009). 
19   Clearly, the comparison between the answers provided by firms in the two waves of the survey might also reflect 
the fact that the question on wage cuts and freezes refers to different time spans: five years in the 2007 survey; 
the recessionary phase in the 2009 survey.  
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In the other euro-area countries that participated in the 2009 survey the incidence of wage freezes 
also  rose  quite  significantly  during  the  recession,  whereas  wage  reductions  increased  only  marginally, 
remaining  relatively  rare.  In  non-euro  area  countries  the  incidence  of  wage  cuts  did  not  increase  but 
nonetheless remained much higher than in the euro area. These average figures hide significant cross-
country variability that, as shown by Fabiani et al. (2010b), is partly explained by the institutional setup; in 
particular, the extent of centralised collective bargaining and the stringency of EPL are found to play a 
significant role in preventing wage reductions during the recession.
20  
The severity of the fall in demand modestly increased the incidence of wage cuts as well as firms’ 
intention to implement them in the near future (Table 10b). 
Table 10 – Downward wage adjustment in Italy in the last recession  
(percentages) (1) 
(a)  in comparison with other countries 
 
   2007 survey     2009 survey 
 
what they did in the period  
2002-2007 
 
what they have done 
during the crisis 
  
what they intend to do in 
the near future 















No cut or freeze  95.6  91.6  82.1    66.2  62.4  70.1    34.7  56.0  89.3 
Freeze  3.7  7.2  11.4    31.8  35.5  23.4    60.9  40.6  8.0 
Cut  0.7  1.2  6.5    2.0  2.1  6.5    4.3  3.4  2.7 
Total  100  100  100.0     100  100  100     100  100  100 
 
(b)  by intensity of the demand fall 
 
  None / marginal  Moderate  Strong  Exceptionally strong 
What they have done during the crisis 
No cut or freeze  65.0  65.7  68.7  61.6 
Freeze  34.3  32.6  28.7  34.6 
Cut  0.7  1.7  2.6  3.9 
Total  100  100  100  100 
What they intend to do in the near future 
No cut or freeze  43.0  34.5  30.6  39.2 
Freeze  56.3  62.2  62.2  56.5 
Cut  0.7  3.3  7.2  4.3 
Total  100  100  100  100 
(1)  The  figures  are  weighted  by  employment  weights  and  rescaled  excluding  non-responses.  The  euro-area 
average includes Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands; the non-euro-area average includes 
Estonia, the Czech republic and Poland. The figures in the first three columns of panel (a) may not coincide with 
those reported in Table 5 because they refer to firms that participated in both surveys; the differences are 
marginal, however.  
 
Why didn’t Italian firms implement more widespread wage reductions in response to the crisis? The 
questions put to firms in 2007 on the relevance of factors preventing wage cuts were repeated in the 
summer of 2009 to explore whether the constraints on downward wage adjustment were binding even in 
the presence of labour market slack and falling economic activity. 
                                                 
20   In the euro area, France stands out as the country with the highest proportion of firms that kept wages unchanged 
(more than 80%), while in Austria only 1.5% of firms followed this policy. Outside the euro area, 44% of Estonian 
firms implemented wage cuts in response to the deterioration of the economic outlook, as opposed to only 4% of 
Polish firms.  
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The evidence collected in the second survey confirms that labour market regulations and collective 
wage agreements remained the main reasons for firms not to reduce wages (Table 11). Productivity-related 
factors, implied by both adverse selection effects and the negative impact on workers’ effort and morale, 
continued to be the next most important drivers of downward wage rigidity.  
Table 11 – Factors preventing wage cuts during the crisis  
(mean scores; in brackets ranking in the 2007 survey ) (1) 
Labour regulation/collective agreements prevent wages from being cut     3.3 (1) 
In presence of a wage cut the most productive employees might leave the firm    3.0 (1) 
It would reduce employees’ efforts and morale, resulting in less output or poorer service     3.0 (2) 
A wage cut would increase the number of employees who quit, increasing the cost of hiring and training    2.6 (2) 
Employees compare their wage to that of similarly qualified workers in other firms in the same market    2.6 (3) 
It would create difficulties in attracting new workers    2.4 (4) 
It would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer    2.4 (5) 
Workers and firms have an implicit contract: wages will neither fall in recessions nor rise in expansions     2.0 (5) 
(1)  The  table  presents  average  mean  scores  computed  on  the  basis  of  the  answers  provided  by  the  firms 
interviewed in the 2009 survey to the question: “If your firm has not (or is not considering to) cut the base wage, 
how relevant is each one of the following reasons in preventing it ?”. Firms were required to answer for each of the 
theories provided in the list, attaching a score from 1=not relevant to 4=very relevant. Figures in brackets report 
the ranking of each theory in the 2007 survey (see Table 6). 
5.3 Alternative strategies for cost reduction 
Base wage cuts are only one of the strategies firms can pursue to reduce costs when they face 
adverse circumstances. The 2009 WDN survey elicited information on the main channel firms chose to 
adjust costs in response to the fall in demand experienced during the crisis.
21 The range of possibilities 
included wage cuts (base or flexible components), reduction in the input of labour, both at the extensive 
and at the intensive margin (permanent or temporary employees, or hours worked), restraint of non-labour 
costs. Firms were asked to indicate, among these possibilities, only the most important. 
Overall, the vast majority of firms (around two-thirds) chose the reduction of labour costs as their 
key strategy; only 35% acted mainly on the non-labour component (Table 12). The adjustment of labour 
costs was mostly implemented through the layoff of temporary employees and the decrease of hours 
worked (panel a). The latter strategy was followed by 18% of firms (21% in the manufacturing sector). This 
proportion is twice as large as what firms, interviewed in 2007, thought they would do in response to a 
hypothetical demand downturn.
22 Around 17% of firms laid off permanent employees; the disaggregation 
by  size  indicates  that  this  strategy  was  more  widespread  among  very  small  firms  (59%).  Instead,  the 
percentage of firms that reduced the temporary component of their labour force increases with firms’ size 
(from 10% among very small firms to 25% among those with more than 200 employees). 
As for the adjustment of wages, only 1.2% of firms implemented base wage cuts, whereas almost 9% 
managed to reduce the flexible component. 
The  intensity  of  the  shock  faced  by  firms  clearly  mattered.  A  more  pronounced  demand  fall  is 
associated with a larger proportion of firms that adjusted their labour input, either by laying off permanent 
                                                 
21   The same issue was addressed in the 2007 survey with reference to a hypothetical and unanticipated slowdown in 
demand. 
22  According to Cingano et Al. (2010), about 30% of the firms interviewed in 2009 in the Bank of Italy’s periodic 
surveys of industrial and service firms declared that they had applied for support from the Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni, the Government funded scheme for hours reduction.  
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employees or by reducing the number of hours worked (panel b). On the contrary, the more firms suffered 
from the crisis, the less they were capable of responding to the shock by resorting mainly to a reduction of 
non-labour costs. These results are consistent with evidence for Italy based on the Bank of Italy annual 
survey of industrial and non-financial service firms with more than 20 employees, according to which the 
sharp reduction in labour input in 2009 was mainly achieved through a contraction in total hours worked 
per capita and a freeze on hiring. By reducing hours, firms were able to limit the loss of jobs, facilitated in 
this by ample recourse to the Wage Supplementation Fund. Labour turnover fell substantially, especially in 
industry, due to the sharp cut-back in hiring, both of fixed-term and permanent workers; the decline in 
terminations was essentially the result of the reduction in the number of new fixed-term contracts (Bank of 
Italy, Annual Report on 2009). 
Table 12 – Cost reduction in the last recession 
(percentages) (1) 
(a) by sector, size and in comparison with other countries 
      Italy    
    Manuf.  Services     5-19  20-49  50-199  >200     Total   
Euro area  Non-euro area 
Base wage    1.7  0.8    0.0  2.0  0.0  1.1    1.2    1.1  2.7 
Flexible wage component    8.5  9.1    5.8  8.8  8.3  9.2    8.8    8.8  16.4 
Permanent employees    16.4  17.2    58.6  13.4  19.1  15.7    16.8    16.8  19.8 
Temporary employees    21.5  19.4    10.2  15.5  21.5  24.7    20.4    27.8  14.1 
Hours worked    21.0  15.5    14.9  21.9  14.0  16.7    18.1    15.4  6.6 
Non-labour costs    31.1  38.0    10.5  38.4  37.1  32.5    34.7    30.2  40.4 
Total     100  100     100  100  100  100     100     100  100 
 
(b) by intensity of the demand fall 
  None / marginal  Moderate  Strong  Exceptionally strong 
Base wage  0.0  1.2  0.6  6.2 
Flexible wage component  10.6  7.0  10.0  7.8 
Permanent employees  10.6  14.8  19.1  28.0 
Temporary employees  17.6  22.1  20.5  16.6 
Hours worked  15.8  13.4  22.7  25.6 
Non-labour costs  45.5  41.6  27.1  15.8 
Total  100  100  100  100 
(1)  The  figures  are  weighted  by  employment  weights  and  rescaled  excluding  non-
responses. 
In all the European countries involved in the survey costs were mainly contained by reducing the 
input of labour rather than wages (last two columns of panel a). In particular, the behaviour of Italian firms 
appears  very  similar  to  that  observed  in  the  euro  area  as  a  whole.  However,  Fabiani  et  al.  (2010b) 
document substantial heterogeneity across individual countries and in particular between those belonging 
to the euro area and the others.
23 The dispersion observed across countries partly reflects the institutional 
framework. Centralised collective wage agreements and stronger employment protection, for example, are 
found to hinder the adjustment of wages, even the flexible component, and induce cost reduction through 
hours worked and layoffs of temporary employees (Bertola et al., 2009). 
The evidence described so far, though broken down by sectoral or company characteristics, relates 
only to bivariate relationships. We conclude the exploration of firms’ cost adjustment strategies in Italy 
during  the  last  recession  with  a  multivariate  analysis  aimed  at  identifying  the  main  features  that 
discriminate companies in the way they chose to reduce costs, taking into account the interaction between 
                                                 
23   For example, the percentage of firms that chose to reduce temporary employment as the main channel to adjust 
costs was highest in Spain, Belgium and Netherlands (over 40%), while in the Czech Republic and Poland it was 
only 10%.  
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sectoral and corporate characteristics. We group firms into four categories: 1) those that reduced base or 
flexible wages; 2) those that dismissed permanent or temporary workers; 3) those that implemented a 
reduction in hours worked; 4) those that took steps to contain non-labour costs. We adopt a multinomial 
logit estimation approach where the dependent variable, constructed on the basis of the above categories, 
assumes values from 1 to 4.  
The covariates included in the estimated equation are: i) firm-level features such as the composition 
of the workforce (the ratio of, respectively, white-collar, highly-skilled and permanent employees to total 
employees), the firm’s employment turnover, a control variable for firms that outsourced abroad part of 
their activity and for those that follow state-dependent wage adjustment and ii) fixed effects for the sector 
of activity, the firm’s size and its geographical location.
24 Importantly, information on all these aspects 
relates to 2007, when the first wave of the survey was carried out, before the demand and financial shock 
that the global crisis brought about in Italy. Hence these structural features are predetermined in a purely 
econometric sense with respect to the responses to the shocks we analyse here. In addition, we control for 
the type of shock faced by firms, distinguishing between those that suffered a strong demand fall and those 
that, together with the latter, also faced strong financial constraints during the crisis. For this purpose, we 
include two dummy variables among the covariates: the first is equal to 1 if the firm reports that the crisis 
brought a strong/exceptionally strong fall in demand; the second is equal to 1 if the effect of the crisis 
manifested itself both as a strong/exceptionally strong fall in demand and as strong/exceptionally strong 
financial constraints. 
The multinomial logit model is valid if the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
holds, i.e. if the addition or exclusion of categories of the dependent variable does not affect the odds of 
the remaining ones. The IIA assumption is supported, in our regression, by the tests of both Hausman and 
McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao (1985), thus indicating that the estimation procedure adopted is 
applicable given the structure of our data. 
Table 13 reports the estimated coefficients for the adjustment of wages, employment and hours vs. 
reduction  of  non-labour  costs,  which  is  the  baseline  category  (respectively  in  columns  1  to  3). 
Heteroscedasticity-robust p-values are reported in brackets.  
The  results  indicate  that  the  adjustment  strategies  chosen  by  firms  are  strongly  related  to  the 
composition of the workforce. In particular, companies employing a higher share of white-collar and highly-
skilled workers were less likely to dismiss employees than to adjust non-labour costs. They were also less 
likely  to  reduce  hours  worked,  possibly  in  relation  to  the  more  widespread  recourse  to  this  form  of 
flexibility in the manufacturing sector, where the proportion of white-collar workers is typically lower (this 
could also explain why the sectoral dummy is not significant in the regression in column 3). A larger share 
of permanent employees was associated with a preference by firms to adjust non-labour costs rather than 
reduce wages, whereas companies that had previously moved part of their production to newly developed 
countries faced lesser constraints on the reduction of employment and hence were more likely to adopt 
this strategy rather than contain non-labour costs. 
                                                 
24   Time-dependent wage setters are companies that answer positively when asked whether they typically implement 
wage changes at predetermined times of the year. We also assessed the explanatory power of other variables, in 
particular  the  firm’s  exposure  to  foreign  markets  (captured  by  its  export  share),  the  intensity  of  perceived 
competition  (proxied  by  the  firm’s  response  to  competitors’  price  strategies)  and  the  presence  of  firm-level 
collective bargaining, which however proved not to be significant.  
  21 
Table 13 – Firms’ characteristics and margins of cost adjustment  








       
Manufacturing  -0.688**  -0.209  -0.227 
  (0.338)  (0.259)  (0.285) 
< 50 employees  -0.023  -0.396*  0.121 
  (0.327)  (0.234)  (0.267) 
North-East  0.963**  0.477  -0.149 
  (0.443)  (0.342)  (0.384) 
North-West  0.555  0.609*  0.142 
  (0.449)  (0.321)  (0.346) 
South  -0.080  0.467  -0.429 
  (0.601)  (0.396)  (0.476) 
Strong demand shock  0.791**  0.670***  0.816*** 
  (0.348)  (0.249)  (0.287) 
Strong demand and credit shock  0.998*  1.229***  0.996** 
  (0.513)  (0.364)  (0.415) 
State-dependent wages  -0.219  0.535**  -0.039 
  (0.328)  (0.243)  (0.274) 
Outsourcing  0.191  0.596**  0.507 
  (0.419)  (0.292)  (0.345) 
Labour turnover  -0.433  -0.272  -0.736 
  (0.364)  (0.167)  (0.492) 
Share of white-collars  -0.643  -0.794**  -1.53*** 
  (0.544)  (0.394)  (0.469) 
Share of permanent employees  -1.485***  -0.235  0.139 
  (0.570)  (0.467)  (0.530) 
Share of high-skilled employees  0.404  -0.749*  -0.406 
  (0.562)  (0.404)  (0.455) 
Observations  544 
Adj. count R2  0.117 
Log-likelihood  -659.44 
(1)  The  figures  are  estimated  coefficients  for,  respectively,  adjustment  of  wages  (base  and  flexible  component), 
employment  (permanent  and  temporary)  and  hours  of  work  vs.  adjustment  of  non-labour  costs.  P-values  in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Confirming the descriptive evidence described in Table 12, the intensity and nature of the shock 
perceived  by  firms  significantly  affected  their  reactions:  the  larger  the  demand  fall,  the  less  likely  the 
recourse to the adjustment of non-labour costs, as opposed to all the other strategies. Moreover, the 
probability of acting on labour costs (independently of the channels adopted) was significantly larger for 
firms  facing  both  a  strong  negative  demand  shock  and  binding  financial  constraints.  Finally,  with  this 
multivariate approach, the reduction of wages was less likely in the manufacturing sector, whereas the 
probability  of  laying  off  employees  was  lower  in  small  firms.  There  is  also  some  evidence  pointing  to 
heterogeneity in firms’ behaviour across geographical areas: those located in the North-East and the North-
West were, respectively, more prone to act on wages (mostly through the flexible pay component) and on 
employment.
25 
                                                 
25   These  results  also  hold  running  the  regressions  on  two  separate  samples,  including,  respectively,  only 
manufacturing and only services firms.   
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6. Conclusions 
How do Italian firms typically set and adjust their wages? Facing a negative demand shock, what are 
the margins of flexibility they can resort to in order to adjust their costs in a centralised and regulated 
institutional  setup?  Is  downward  wage  rigidity  binding  and,  if  so,  what  are  the  factors  behind  it?  Are 
reactions different/reinforced when the fall in demand is coupled with credit constraints? This paper sheds 
some light on these issues, drawing on the wealth of information collected from two Europe-wide surveys 
of firms carried out at the end of 2007, just before the onset of the global recession, and in mid-2009. 
In Italy wage adjustment at the firm level is infrequent (the average wage duration is almost two 
years, among the highest in Europe); downward nominal rigidity is a persistent feature of wage behaviour, 
as in most other euro area countries . In the face of an unprecedented fall in demand (perceived as strong 
or exceptionally strong by around half of Italian firms), increasing unemployment, zero inflation and gloomy 
short-term prospects, by the summer of 2009 wage freezes had become significantly more extensive than 
in normal times: approximately one-third of firms kept their wages constant during the crisis (less than 4% 
in the 2003-2007 period). On the contrary, only a very modest proportion of employers had reduced wages. 
The  main  reasons  not  to  engage  in  more  widespread  wage  cuts  were,  as  reported  by  firms,  not  only 
institutional  constraints  –  labour  regulations  and  collective  agreements  –  but  also  productivity  related 
factors – as predicted by efficiency wage and adverse selection models.  
Italian companies pursued alternative strategies to reduce costs in response to the sharp demand fall 
they faced. For most of them, the adjustment occurred through a modification of the input of labour, either 
at the extensive or at the intensive margin. In particular, the more severely firms were hit by the crisis, the 
more they had recourse to a reduction in hours worked and permanent workers, as opposed to resorting 
mainly to the adjustment of non-labour-costs; this effect was magnified for those firms also facing financial 
constraints. The composition of the labour force also affected the margin of adjustment chosen: companies 
employing a higher proportion of white-collar workers and highly-skilled workers were less likely to dismiss 
employees  than  to  adjust  non-labour  costs,  plausibly  reflecting  the  attempt  to  preserve  their  human 
capital. They were also less likely to reduce hours worked, possibly in relation to the more widespread 
recourse  to  this  form  of  flexibility  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  where  the  proportion  of  white-collar 
workers is typically lower.  
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Appendix A – The 2009 survey questionnaire 
1 – To what extent is your firm’s activity (in terms of turnover) affected by the current economic and financial crisis?   
Please choose a single option 
□ Negatively affected (please specify) ￿      □  marginally            □  moderately            □  strongly              □  exceptionally strongly 
□ Positively affected 
□ Not at all 
2 – To what extent is the current economic and financial crisis affecting your firm with respect to each of the following aspects? 
Please choose an option for each line  
 
not at all / 
marginally 





Fall in the demand for your firm’s products/services  □  □  □  □  □ 
Difficulty in financing  activity through the usual financial channels  □  □  □  □  □ 
Difficulty in being paid by customers  □  □  □  □  □ 
Difficulty in obtaining intermediate products from your firm’s usual suppliers  □  □  □  □  □ 
3 – If the current economic and financial crisis is causing a fall in the demand for your firm’s products/services, which of the following strategies has your firm 
adopted (or is going to adopt) to face such a fall? 











Reduce prices  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce output  □  □  □  □  □ 
Reduce costs  □  □  □  □  □ 
4 – If the reduction of costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 3, please indicate the main channel through which this goal is achieved in your firm. 
Please choose a single option, the most important factor 
Reduce base wages  □ 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc.)  □ 
Reduce the number of permanent employees   □ 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers  □ 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee  □ 
Reduce non-labour costs  □ 
5 – In the current economic and financial crisis, has your firm (or is it going to) frozen the base wage of some employees? 
Freeze in base wage: base wage in nominal terms is unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next 
The last two options are not mutually exclusive  
- No  □ 
- Yes we froze the nominal base wage  □            for what percentage of employees  ____% 
- Yes we are going to freeze the nominal base wage  □ 
6 – In the current economic and financial crisis, has your firm (or is it going to) cut the base wage of some employees? 
Cut in base wage: base wage in nominal terms is decreases from a pay negotiation to the next 
The last two options are not mutually exclusive 
- No  □ 
- Yes we cut the nominal base wage  □            for what percentage of employees  ____% 
- Yes we are going to cut the nominal base wage  □ 
7 – If your firm has not (or is not considering to) cut the base wage, how relevant is each one of the following reasons in preventing it ? 











a. Labour regulation/collective agreements prevent wages from being cut  □  □  □  □  □ 
b. It would reduce employees’ efforts, resulting in less output or poorer 
service 
□  □  □  □  □ 
c. It would have a negative impact on employees' morale  □  □  □  □  □ 
d. It would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer, making it more 
difficult to hire workers in the future 
□  □  □  □  □ 
e. In presence of a wage cut the most productive employees might leave 
the firm 
□  □  □  □  □ 
f. A wage cut would increase the number of employees who quit, 
increasing the cost of hiring and training new workers  
□  □  □  □  □ 
g. It would create difficulties in attracting new workers  □  □  □  □  □ 
h. Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income. therefore workers 
and firms reach an implicit understanding  that wages will neither fall in 
recessions nor rise in expansions 
□  □  □  □  □ 
i. Employees compare their wage to that of similarly qualified  workers in 
other firms in the same market 
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Appendix B – Wage-price relationships 
The interaction between wage and pricing policies at the firm level had been investigated within the 
Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network, which found, on the basis of mostly anecdotal evidence, that 
wage  rigidity  is  an  important  factor  behind  price  stickiness  and  inflation  inertia  in  the  euro  area  (see 
Altissimo et al, 2006). The WDN survey tackled this issue by focusing on two aspects: i) whether firms’ 
decisions on wage and price adjustment are related and ii) the response of prices to wage shocks. 
On  the  first  aspect,  only  about  30%  of  firms  acknowledge  some  relationship  between  the  two 
decisions (Table B1), with no particular pattern, while 8% (10 in services where labour costs are a higher 
proportion of total costs) report that price changes tend to follow wage changes. These results are broadly 
in line with what was found for the other European countries covered by the survey and the euro area as a 
whole. 
 
Table B1 – The link between price and wage changes 
(percentages) 
  Total  Manufacturing  Services 
no link  54.4  51.4  57.0 
there is a link but no particular pattern  30.3  37.5  24.0 
decisions taken simultaneously  1.2  0.8  1.5 
price changes follow wage changes  8.0  5.3  10.2 
wage changes follow price changes  1.5  0.9  2.1 
don't know/not applicable  4.7  4.1  5.2 
 
The relationship between wage and price adjustment appears much stronger when one addresses 
the second aspect, i.e. firm’s reactions to unexpected permanent changes in wages. Indeed, when asked to 
assess the relevance of various adjustment strategies to a wage shock (Table B2), about 60% of Italian firms 
report that they would increase prices (which is in line with the results for the other European countries). 
Table B2 –Strategies for adjusting to shocks  
(percentage of firms answering "relevant" or "very relevant") (1) 
  
 
demand slowdown  cost-push shock  wage increase 
       
Adjust prices  56.4  62.7  58.0 
Reduce output  42.6  26.6  18.7 
Reduce costs  88.8  82.4  77.8 
(1)  The  figures  are  weighted  by  employment  weights  and  rescaled  excluding  non-
responses. 
 